This article presents the problem of lack of restitution in Poland in the political, social and economic context. The author presents the theory of institutional lock-in, referring to the hitherto course of the political, social and economic transformation processes in Poland. She is focusing on the research problem in form of an institutional lock-in on the route to general restitution process. The author examines the path shaping and path dependence to understand the current negative attitude toward restitution presented by the government and society. The author also indicates the costs caused by lack of restitution. Through analysis of past attempts of restitution regulations the author indicates the most important fl ashpoints. A hypothesis constructed by the author focuses on the negative effects of institutional lock-in, lack of restitution increases transaction costs infl uencing the Polish economy. The study is based on the legal documents and the results of public opinion polls.
INTRODUCTION
The democratic state has foundations in institutions arranged in a hierarchy. A general compatibility and a complementarity of an institutional framework create an environment for a long-term development. The most critical are proto institutions, such as: property rights, rules of the exchange, an organization of economy and policy. These standards form basis for the other institutions, do not change quickly and often (Aoki, 2001) .
Property rights refl ect the county's economic system and values accepted by the society. The national institutional framework indicates the nature and extent of these rights, the way they are utilised and thus the possibility of maximizing value (Eggertson, 1996) . These rights allow the use of resources, but in a specifi cally identifi ed society; they need the special protection provided by public actors to produce the large scope of benefi ts.
Socio-political and economic transformation experienced by the post-socialist states concerned the basic elements of the institutional framework. The implementation of equality in protection of the property rights became the foundation for the modern democratic state. The new legal rules and amended acts established the new order for the future, however the consequences of the past events were still existent and caused obstacles for the new system's introduction.
The transformation period required a transfer of real property from public to private actors in form of privatisation as the fundamental process. There were many ways and instruments used for restoration of private property, the aim was common -to create the environment for market reforms, entrepreneurship and capital formation, generally accelerating economic growth. However, one of the fundamental problems created by socialist regimes legacy was lack of clear property rights settlement. In each post socialist country there was the different scope of taken over properties and -in result -a various number of harmed people. The restitution process, understood as settlement of disputes and claims made by previous owners and their heirs, was a necessary fi rst step to the new order's implementation.
Restitution programs in East and Central Europe derived energy from revolutionary time of general change (Appel, 2005) . These processes had often taken place together with the most profound system changes, in fact in some countries it was an inevitably and necessary process to establish market economy. East Germany, Hungary or Czechoslovakia introduced the legal basis of restitution in the beginning of 90-ties, however the completion of these processes was really extended in time. Among post socialist and democratic countries Poland is the only one that did not carry out the general restitution. Notwithstanding the fact that many properties were taken over by the state during socialist time, the successive parliaments have not produced any general legal act for settlement of the claims 1 . Poland is a member of EU, has democratic institutions and experiences a fast economic development. From this perspective there are important questions to be asked about the foundations of the national institutional framework. They refer to grounds and reasons of lack of general restitution process in Poland, the functioning of state with so large "gap" in institutional framework and the consequences of this situation. The author searches the answers gaining support in path dependence and path shaping approaches.
THE PATH DEPENDENCE AND PATH SHAPING APPROACHES
The concept of path dependence was used by P. David and B. Arthur in 80-ties in the technological change processes' explanation. The idea disseminated and as a result has been used in many different areas of research, among others in analyzing transition economies. The main thought can be simply described in following way: (Myles, Pierson, 2001, p. 312) : "each step along a path produces consequences which make that path more attractive in the next round and raises the costs of shifting to an alternative path".
The main idea of path dependent described by David and Arthur warns that there is the possibility of a lock-in to durably ineffi cient solutions because of increasing returns and the infl uence of small random events. However, there is necessary to mention that on the institutional ground there are various approaches indicating the unique and different framework due to the institutions' specifi city. Some authors adopt the idea that institutional evolution is path dependent in David and Arthurs' sense and some calls into question the degree of institutional lock-in (Vincensini, 2001) .
Moreover, there are authors analyzing transforming economies using the concept of path shaping process (neoliberal attitude). This approach treats post socialist countries as an institutional vacuum, a tabula rasa, ready to be fulfi ll with new institutions. This neoliberal attitude was mirrored in the way the biggest changes in 90-ties were introduced in some of the post socialist countries.
There are also researchers utilizing both path dependence and path shaping approaches in analyzing the socio and economic transitional environment (Nielsen, at al 1995, p. 8) . They underline the signifi cance of combination of old ideas and institutions, and the new one in conceptualizing and understanding the transformation process: "Whereas the path-dependency approach serves well to highlight certain crucial features of the state socialist past, the key features of state socialist present would seem to be well captured through the notion of ´path-shaping´" (Nielsen, at al 1995, p. 8) . In this paper the last approach is utilized.
The process of profound change amending social priorities and objectives was not uniform in its structure; in general three subperiods might be enumerated by using a criterion for embeddedness of a change: the period of breakthrough (usually few months or even only weeks), the period of institutionalization of the new order (some years), and the period of restructuring (35-55 years) (Kollmorgen, 2010) . The path shaping process was visible mostly during the fi rst phase, it had the role of a trigger for establishing the new order. The embeddedness of new institutions required longer period and had links to the past and new rules of governance. The mixture of old and new sculptured the future. The path-shaping process was responsible for emergence of the Polish new democratic state introducing in the short period the new rules. In 1989 started profound reforms mirroring the period of breakthrough, they aimed at creating the conditions for the functioning of the market economy. One aspect in this context appears to be of a primary importance -the regulation of property rights. Amended Constitution abolished special privileges granted during the socialist time to public actors. This had raised the need for revision of a number of legal acts to implement the principle of equality and limit the scope of intervention made by the state into private ownership. The new rules were introduced taking a market economy as a model. These basic changes can be treated as a fi rst stage of system reforms, that in subsequent years were supplemented and refi ned.
One important problem was not solved in Poland during this period, despite the fact that it was strongly connected with property rights -the restitution. Restitution is understood here as the process of re-gaining property (also in form of compensation), taken over unlawfully by the state during the socialist time. This operation should have been induced by ethical norms, justice and solidarity of society. In many post socialist countries restitution was the evidence of new just order, visible sign of the end of past nationalization and expropriation programs. It was also a vehicle to receive benefi ts compatible with the larger systemic goal of creating a capitalist economy and a law-based polity (Calhoun, 2004) . The restoring of original legal status would have created the link to system prior socialist one and also meant that the government was the successor of the previous one.
There is an important question why so many years have not produced any clear solution for old expropriation and nationalisation, is there an institutional lock-in induced by unique Polish conditions? The lack of restitution in Poland has created a hole in national institutional framework (Józefi ak 1999; Łaszkiewicz 1999) .
THE HISTORICAL LEGACY -SCALE OF EXPROPRIATION AND NATIONALIZATION IN POLAND
Nationalisation and expropriations were tools that enabled the rise of state ownership -the most welcomed in the socialist regime. In Poland there were issued 16 legal acts creating the background for compulsory purchase 2 . As a consequence, the state took over not only the largest enterprises, but also medium-and small-sized fi rms, with the exception of handicraft workshops. Unlike other socialist countries, in Poland people were still allowed to own land, but trends towards collective farming were visible. The country had much bigger private property market during socialist time than the other socialist countries (Lerman, 1999) . Offi cially, farms were mostly sold by private owners to the state and public entities. In fact, there was a big informal market of farms traded between individuals. This was necessitated by economic reasons -low effi ciency of collective farms and changes in the political situation. The speed and the scale of ownership restructuring depended on the political situation -the strongest pressure could be felt in the period of 1948-56, then the grip was slowly being loosened. Some laws in 70-ties tried to formalise illegal contracts and "grey" property market.
In Poland subjects of restitution can be divided into 3 groups. Group 1 consists of real estate taken over by means of nationalisation, as well as individual administrative decisions (mostly expropriations without compensation) 3 . Group 2 refers to real estate taken over only in Warsaw due to a special law enacted in 1945 4 . The last group refers to assets abandoned in the formerly eastern territory of Poland 5 .
3 Domestic owners of property nationalized on the basis of Nationalization of the Basic Branches of the National Economy Act 1946 were supposed to receive some equivalents but very often they were not paid. 4 The government of the Polish People's Republic (PPR) took over about 17,000 real estates in Warsaw (Act 1945); the owners were only allowed to write petitions to receive some sort of a leasehold right to their previous property. Some of them exercised that option but the effects were diversifi ed-no answer, negative answer or rarely positive one. Today there are some legal reasons for claiming restitution in some of these cases, but the administrative track is long and complicated.
5 About their long fi ght for the legal solution look Broniowski v. Poland case, application 31443/96, European Court of Human Rights.
THE PARLIAMENT'S ACTIVITY ON RESTITUTION FIELD
To have the picture of the restitution attempts in the whole post socialist period in Poland, there is necessary to compare the legal documents. The author built and analyzed the collection of all drafts of bills referring to restitution produced by Polish Parliament and governments. There is an important aspect of timing -the comparison of drafts' dates with fundamental political moments gives the opportunity to evaluate the signifi cance of restitution from the point of view of Polish politicians. The fi rst draft had the date of 1.07.1994 (Parliamentary bill No 532) and it focused only on real properties taken over in Warsaw 6 . The next attempt -there was the Parliament resolution imposing the obligation on the government to prepare the general restitution draft 7 . There is a need to underline that during the path shaping phase there was no strong attempts of general restitution's introduction in Poland. This state of affairs produces the visible sign that restitution was not a very important factor for Polish politicians.
During second part of 90-ties, when the process of transition was almost completed, there were the next attempts for restitution -the President of Poland was responsible for one draft 8 and Parliament created its own version 9 . The political parties had many various concepts how to implement restitution. The potential 6 Draft of a parliament bill about the regulation of claims arising from the acquisition of real property in Warsaw (print No. 532, 01.07.1994) .
7 Draft of a parliament bill about a commitment of the Government to prepare a government bill on compensation for property taken in violation of law in the years 1944 -1962 (print No. 768, 02.12.1994 . 8 Presented by the President draft of a bill on the regulation of claims arising from the acquisition of real property in Warsaw (Print No. 1289 , 14.09.1995 .
9 Draft of a parliament bill on the regulation of claims arising from the acquisition of real property in Warsaw (Print No. 1663 , 11.04.1996 solutions were strictly connected with the political option of the proposing party.
Following the most important matters -such as the type(s) of the entitled persons, the means of restitution, the conditions of restitution and the expected costs, the draft laws differed in many respects. Legal reasons for a claim remain almost the same but forms of restitution have changed dramatically from restitution in kind (restitutio in integrum -reversion of the expropriated or nationalized property); equivalent real property, restitution bonds to fi nancial compensation.
The best opportunity for the implementation of general restitution law was in March 2001, when the Parliament enacted a relevant law (it was the draft dated on 1998), which, however, was rejected by the President of the country (veto). The government coalition failed to gather the three-fi fths majority necessary to override the President's veto, and the bill was rejected.
In 2005 just one part of claims was regulated due to the state obligation imposed by Tribunal in Strasburg verdict (The realization of compensation owing to assets abandoned in the formerly eastern territory of Poland Act 2005).
In 2005 there was the new draft proposed by the government with status of "work in progress" during the next years. The most current information from governmental source says about the draft prepared in Ministry of Treasury in 2009. The legal solutions proposed in this document were negatively evaluated by Government and Local Government Committee. There have been still discussions in many committees and ministries about this version.
THE CHOSEN ROUTE FOR POLISH RESTITUTION
Preparing a pattern for restitution some general directions taken on the state level should be enumerated: an establishment of restitution rules and its implementation (various detailed forms and limits); a confi rmation of current ownership structure and closing possibility of claims (however, it seems to be in contrary to international law) and state of inertia as a result of not taking any decisions. The Polish case seems to be the last one. Despite many previous efforts there has been a suspension of the general restitution process in the national scale, however there have been same legal possibilities of re-gaining of property or receiving compensation by virtue of civil and administrative courts' individual verdicts. In many cases a relevant administrative decision is the very fi rst step in the long process of individual restitution. In spite of many potential claims only few have been solved in this way. Most of the eligible persons are still waiting for the general restitution law.
There are important questions -why this way -state inertia -was chosen and what are the consequences of it. Restitution in Poland has not been conducted in path shaping phase because it was on the one hand a really diffi cult and complicated process connected with political, ethical and technical problems, on the other, was not essential for carrying out economic reforms. Polish specifi city is that private ownership always existed and only a small group of people directly bore the brunt of nationalization and expropriation attack in Poland. The authorities evaluated that the number of persons having claims would have reach about 170,000 (but nobody knows precisely the real number). The work on the introduction of the statutory rules of restitution have been therefore the result of clashing moral needs of reparations for victims and the economic needs of the country. The very substantial value of their claims was estimated at more than PLN 140 billion (about PLN 40 billion for Warsaw claims) in 2008. In that context, the authorities and society had been faced with very diffi cult economic, legal and moral issues.
Returning property to past owners would create problems with rights of individuals currently using it. Often they are public schools, universities, hospitals etc. The restitution in kind would have not been possible in many cases. There has been a need of a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community -society and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights 10 . There is also a technical problem referring to the current value of restituted goods or amount of compensations and previous value of goods taken over. Property markets have changed fundamentally during so long period. Changes in markets, infrastructure, and agricultural production, physical re-shaping may have taken place, the land restituted may be subject to legal restrictions and obligations that may not have existed at the time of expropriation (Riddel 2000; Walsh, Taff 2002) .
Passage of time contributed to the increase in the level of indifference and even hostility of citizens to meet restitution claims. This social attitude infl uences the political willingness to solve the problem of restitution. The issue has two different respondent groups -these entitled to claim and the rest of society. After the dramatic political change in 1989 the group of people feeling restitution's obligation was much bigger than nowadays -65 % in 91 and 34% in 2008 -see fi gure 1. It is meaningful and important that there is no new research on this fi eld, the last one was in 2008.
It is visible that the groups of opponents and undecided are growing. This result can be explained with use of three-period structure of system change. During the fi rst stage the path shaping decisions were taken by the political representatives, than people absorbed the new rules and adjusted to them, there is a process of institutionalization and path dependence consequences.
The social attitude to restitution may also be seen as one of the indicators of social capital's low level in Poland what is a legacy of socialist system, however it has had deeper roots in Polish history. Social capital, in essence, are the institutions, relationships, attitudes and values governing interactions amongst people and contributing to economic and social development (Iyer, at al 2005) . The social capital includes shared values and rules for social conduct including trust and civic responsibility. Social capital infl uences the social and political environment that in turn shapes norms such as those with respect to government, the rule of law, and civil and political liberties (OLSON 1982) .
The Polish path dependence has been creating the problem of emerging the civic society and social solidarity, the lack of the state during 120 years should also be mentioned. According to the European Social Survey 2002-03 Polish society was very much distrustful in its perception of the central and local governments and fellow citizens. For Poles the most important things are a marriage, children and health (Czapiński, Panek 2006) . The creation of the society requires more levels of communication and cooperation. The vacuum between family and nation has not been got fi lled by civic society (Czapiński, 2006) . Nowadays, there is a social distrust and feeling that in diffi cult fi nancial situation of the State some of the citizens would be extra awarded by restitution process and the burden would be paid by the rest of the society. The negative attitudes are reinforced by media's news about frauds and dishonest attempts of bogus owners to take property over. For many Poles restitution would give additional means to group privileged in pre-socialist period. Also there is a common anxiety about very high costs of restitution.
INSTITUTIONAL LOCK-IN
The lock-in of an institutional path can be a result of the imperfection of feedbacks on agents' subjective models and existing organizations and interest groups strength. This lock-in shapes the policy and the possibility to adapt new institutions. Institutional change in general and in ownership forms in particular, displays sensitivity to initial conditions and increasing returns because it builds on existing institutions and knowledge, which channel change in certain directions to the exclusion of others (Vincensini, 2001) . The strong path shaping efforts of the government were visible during the fi rst phase of transition in Poland. During the next years strong path dependent ideas revealed, linked to the legacy of socialist way of thinking (Karklins, 2005) . Ideal of Justice, which required compensation for harm caused during the socialist period lost importance.
Institutional lock-in in surveyed fi eld implicates the false evaluation that implicated decisions (in fact -lack of decisions) are the best possible solution in current conditions. Investigating the route leading to present state of affairs it is also necessary to identify factors responsible for lock-in (table 1) . The political reason for current course is connected with small bargaining power of the entitled to restitution claims. The group was not big and their political signifi cance was limited. They lost their chance during the very fi rst moment of transition. Offi cially, there is still work in progress, the draft prepared in Ministry of Treasury in 2009 can be used as an evidence for good will of Polish government.
The social background supporting current course is connected with amnesia of the negative results of socialist past. After the system reforms were made, the rearrangement of property rights pattern was very diffi cult. The Constitutional Tribunal in 2001 stated that new property relations were created mostly in persistent and irreversible way and length of time passed, gave these relations persistence and created the fundamental for economic and social existence of Polish society
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. 11 However, it should be remembered that Poland has full autonomy in choosing the way, scope and limits of restitution process but is bound by rules of equal treatment of entitled persons and justice, without any legal solution it
Increasing political "returns"
• Unpopular decisions are not taken (political supporters are not discouraged) • Officially, there is "work in progress" as an excuse
Increasing economic "returns"
• No need to incur direct expenditure, transaction costs are not visible
Increasing social "returns"
• Social amnesia about socialist time -Keeping existing ownership structure -Forgetting about not fair behavior
Lock-in
The institutionalization introduced dynamically by new legal and social rules together with the consolidation of the new order were absorbed by people. They accepted changes and built new vision of the world. Current deep change would have gone beyond the needs of the average citizen. Option polls results give the evidence that Polish society does not feel collective moral obligation to conduct restitution, less than half of the respondents answers that it would be morally just.
The signs of this institutional problem might be also fi nd in veto of Polish President against restitution act. The President justifi ed his decision by indicating that the restitution law infringed the constitutional rules of social justice and equal treatment. He stressed that if implemented the act would deprive municipalities of important part of income 12 .
The another important reason for lock-in in current course has economic nature. On the one hand there is the problem of compensation for old detriments, building the respect for property rights and regulation of the ownership relations but on the other hand there is a fi nancial burden for the whole society. The legal reasoning to the draft of general restitution act of 2005 provides information about possible fi nancial burden imposed by the implementation of regulation. Probably, there would be more than 55 000 applications with requests for return of property or payment of compensation. From the calculation of the public administration, value of claims, including the historical monuments was PLN 36,1 billion. In 2008 the Ministry of Treasury estimated the value again and the result was PLN 140 billion (PLN 40 billion as a compensation for real properties taken over in Warsaw). 12 According to the act municipalities would have to give back real property valued at PLN 10 billion and in Warsaw at PLN 13.5 billion, without any assistance from the State.
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms requires that the amount of compensation granted for property taken by the State be "reasonably related" to its value. In Polish circumstances limitations on compensation seems to be justifi able and the current draft of restitution act based on this assumption 13 .
THE TRANSACTION COSTS OF CURRENT COURSE
The conclusion for the calculation of the costs referring to fulfi llment of restitution obligations seems to be simply -not providing the general ground for restitution claims would make the enormous savings for Treasury. However, this conclusion is not justifi ed. The real transaction costs induced by unsettled restitution claims and unclear ownership are currently the heavy burden for both -private and public actors. Potential individual restitution claims expose investors buying property from public actors to the higher risk. They are not sure about the timing and security of their investments -as a project can be arrested if an individual lawsuit is fi led (there is enormous number of this kind of cases). This disincentives to investment in Poland due to higher risk and higher cost of protection. Another problem is the uneven legal situation of people living in the public housing stock, residents of houses returned after a long process to their former owners are in a much more diffi cult position in relation to their neighbors in municipal buildings who are able to buy fl ats with 90% reduction.
Besides, the State's fi nance is exposed to a possible strain, as compensation in cash will have to be paid to those former owners who succeeded in long and expensive trials 14 . The lack of settlement of property rights also poses a threat to local governments; when a lawsuit with former owners is lost, the claimed property has to be returned or huge compensation paid. The ultimate stock of property held by a municipalities is uncertain. There is also a legal problem referring to real properties taken over by the State but then transmitted to local government -who is an actor responsible for payment of restitution claims -Treasury or local government? In the Resolution of the Supreme Court made on 16.11.2004 r. (III CZP 64/04; OSNC No 11/2005, 182) it was indicated that the compensation should be paied by municipality. While the Resolution of the Supreme Court made on 7.12.2006 r. (III CZP 99/06; OSNC No 6/2007, 79) fi nally settled that Treasury is legitimized to compensate for damage resulting from an administrative decision, even if annulment of this decision or declaration that it was issued in violation of the law, occurred after 05. 26.1990 .
Very important for the amount of transaction costs arising from the current course of restitution is to determine the adjudicated compensation. The Constitutional Court took up this issue in the verdict made on 8. 5.1990 (K 1/90; OTK No 2/1990, 20) and stated that: "a reasonable compensation is fair compensation. Fair compensation is an equivalent, because only such does not violate the essence of compensation". The Constitutional Court added that: "this means that the owner should have the opportunity to reproduce the lost property, or, more broadly speaking, the compensation restores a fi nancial situation of the former owner, he had before expropriation. Compensation shall not be in any way reduced, and not just by the method of calculation of its amount, but also the mode of payment".
Only introduction of general principles in the Act about restitution would allow to limit the compensation in a fair way, as an expression of an equal treatment for all entitled people and the result of fi nancial situation of the State. The individual verdicts are based on individual judgments about fair compensation and they create space for unequal treatment.
There are also additional costs arising from a perennial processes and involvement of experts. These costs are essentially invisible to the public, however, increasing every year.
Amendments to the Act on Commercialization and privatization (Dz. U. 216/2013) Kraków, on the occasion of mentioned amendment, also reported funding needs having source in compensation payments.
The local authority presented documents about the court case (Krzeszowice assets belonging to the Potocki family), and estimated compensation for non-contractual use of land was in amount of PLN 34,2 million from the city and PLN 44,3 million from the Treasury (Pismo Starosty Krakowskiego z dn. 8.08.2013 r. do Marszałka Senatu Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej). The local authority also asked for money from the Restitution Fund.
A law that would allow to solve the problem of restitution of the whole country would not be associated with the bankruptcy of the state. The ability to determine the limit of compensation has already been used in restitution laws relating to the former eastern territories of Poland.
Namely, there is only one group of claimants having general legal ground for restitution -Polish citizens who left their property in previous territory of Poland (current Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania) coming to Poland after II WW and people who were repatriated from Soviet Union and their heirs. This regulation was the result of Broniowski v. Poland case (Broniowski v. Poland, no. 31443/96, § 131, ECHR 2004-V) , won by Broniowski in Strasburg. The Polish parliament realized obligation and issued the act generally solving this kind of restitution problems. The left property is valued and this value is described in documents. Entitled people have right to 20% of value of left property. They can ask for a compensation or discount in price or fee when they are buying public property or are using them. At the end of 2006 the fi rst compensations were paid. According to information given by Ministry of Treasury the by the end of November 2013, there were taken 53859 positive decisions and there were issued certifi cates proving the right to compensation in the amount of approx. PLN 2,7 billion.
CONCLUSIONS
The institutional lock-in does not allow for far-reaching changes from the primary direction. The theoretically built prosperity being the reason for the previous choice, can be in reality much smaller than assumed. The detailed analysis can show that another solution would be more favourable, more effi cient. In reality, however, not many people are interested in looking for different path, the majority seems to see the current course only and in result the possibility to apply different option is impossible or very diffi cult.
In countries that have undergone substantial transformation, the path shaping process created the conditions for the introduction and stabilization of the new rules.
In Poland, unlike in the other post socialist states, the general restitution law was not introduced. This has led to a strengthening of ownership structures from socialist time. From the western point of view restitution represents a need to correct for injustices perpetrated under communism, it is perceived as a link between anticommunism and nationhood (Appel, 2005) . When the new system had been introduced there was a kind of common political and social agreement about restitution but then division in society and politicians concerning problem of distributional justice emerged and increased (Koźminski, 1997) .
For most Poles restitution is perceived as a kind of redistribution of national wealth. The redistribution which is not justifi ed. The moral obligation of compensation is seen mainly by these whose families were harmed and there is only a small group. The entitled persons feel the current bureaucratic process for restitution as Kafkaesque (Chodakiewicz, Currell, 2003) . The tension and discontent have increased by announcement of few famous verdicts giving a lot of money to small number of people and the rest of entitled needs to wait and does not know how long and for how much. In the same time the majority of society perceives these verdicts as an evidence of distributional injustice from the point of view of not entitled persons. This situation seems to be too complicated for simply solution. The polarization in society's opinion has been increasing. This social attitude creates very difficult environment for the authorities. They should have conducted the restitution but there is neither money nor the feeling of responsibility for previous harm. Nobody counts the hidden cost of current lack of general restitution: court cases costs (there is no collection of restitution verdicts), compensations paid in the whole value, discouraged investors.
The Polish Minister of Finance on March 5, 2010 pointed out that in the case of entry into force the restitution law in 2012 there would be an increase of the growth of public debt to the level higher than authorised by the European Union (as the ratio of public debt to GDP). Since this statement, nothing has changed in terms of regulating the process of restitution. The Government appears to be justifi ed in its passivity by economic problems. However, the example of restitution conducted for the property in former eastern territories of Poland gives the evidence that it is possible. The trigger for this procedure was given from outside what provides to conclusions that construction of Polish institutional framework is not completed.
